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In response to Defendant, Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc.'s 
Brief, Plaintiff, Richard S. Smith, hereby submits the following 
Reply Brief in support of his argument in the above captioned case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT L 
THE CONSULTING ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN RICHARD SMITH AND 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS WAS A VALID EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT AND 
WAS NOT TERMINABLE AT WILL. 
In his brief, Defendant contends that the consulting agreement 
between Defendant and Plaintiff was merely a personal employment 
contract terminable at the will of either party. 
Defendant cites the case of Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P. 2d 790 
(Utah 1979), which defines the general rule in Utah regarding 
personal employment contracts. In Bihlmaier, the Utah Supreme 
Court states: 
"The general rule concerning personal employment 
contracts is, in the absence of some further express or 
implied stipulation as to the duration of the employment 
or of a good consideration in addition to the services 
contracted to be rendered, the contract is no more than 
an indefinite general hiring which is terminable at the 
will of either party." 
Contrary to Defendant's contentions, it is obvious that the 
consulting arrangement has an express stipulation as to the 
duration of the employment of Plaintiff. On December 27, 1983, 
Plaintiff sent Defendant the first of two memos, the subject matter 
was "Plaintiff's Consulting Arrangement for 1984." (Ex. 12) On 
February 15, 1984, Plaintiff sent Defendant the second memo which 
outlined the basic consulting agreement between Plaintiff and 
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Defendant. This memo states: 
"On December 17, 1983, I wrote a memo for your acceptance 
which outlined the basis on which I would continue to be 
of service to Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc., over the 
next year." The purpose of this memo is to replace the 
December 27th memo based on our conversations and 
agreements between then and now." (Ex. 13) 
The memo then discusses Plaintiff's employment assignments for 
1984. 
The memo was acknowledged and accepted by James B. Burr, 
acting as President of Defendant, Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. 
It is obvious from the face of this document that it was to be an 
agreement which would be in effect throughout the year 1984. Under 
the Bihlmaier standard, this express stipulation as to the duration 
of the employment clearly takes the consulting arrangement out of 
the category of being simply an "at will" contract. It is a valid 
contract definitely regarding duration, which was signed by both 
parties. 
Assuming arguendo, that it was an "at will" contract which 
could be terminated by either party, there is still a duty of good 
faith and fair dealing implicit in the contract. Several courts 
which have considered this issue have held that even in an at will 
contract, a termination not made in good faith constitutes a breach 
of that contract. See Fortune vs. National Cash Register Co., 364 
N.E. 2d 1251 (1977); Cleary vs. American Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. 
App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr.722 (1980); S.B. Mitford vs. de Lasala, 
666 P.2d 1000 (Ala. 1983). 
Defendant owed Plaintiff this implied duty of good faith and 
fair dealing that is found in all contracts. It is clear in this 
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case that this duty was breached and Plaintiff was terminated in 
bad faith, therefore, the Trial Court's finding of wrongful 
termination of the consulting arrangement should be upheld. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF HAD A VALID EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WITH DEFENDANT AND 
SAID CONTRACT WAS TERMINATED WRONGFULLY BY THE DEFENDANT. 
Defendant states that if Plaintiff's consulting arrangement 
was a valid contract, Defendant terminated this arrangement with 
"just cause". The standard in Utah for terminating an employee 
with just cause is found in Chiodo v. General Waterworks 
Corporation, 413 P.2d 891 (Utah 1966). In Chiodo, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that the failure of an employee to adhere to standards 
expected of an employee is justifiable cause for employer to 
discharge him. The court then defined these standards as follows: 
"The employee rendering honest, faithful and loyal 
service in accordance with his ability. If there is a 
wilful and substantial failure to adhere to those 
standards, it would be justifiable cause for the employer 
to discharge him." Chiodo @414. 
This is clearly not the case presented by this appeal. 
Plaintiff performed his duties for Defendant extremely well and 
negotiated several deals which were very beneficial to Defendant. 
Plaintiff was successful in his employment in the following areas: 
1. Restructuring the Company's financial position by the 
adoption of certain accounting procedures suggested by the 
Plaintiff. 
2. Refinancing the Teachers1 Insurance Fund obligation with a 
cash discount of approximately $750,000 to the Company; 
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3. Restructuring the Company's arrangement with its preferred 
shareholders at less cost to the Company and its common 
shareholders than had theretofore been provided in other 
alternatives previously considered by the Company; 
4. In securing Releases from the preferred shareholders 
concerning their Rights of Conversion. (R.291-292) 
It is clear that Mr. Smith was definitely a benefit to 
Defendant. The issue of loyalty is addressed in a November 2, 
1983, memo from Plaintiff to Defendant regarding Plaintiff's work 
with the Ascher Finley Co. (a general partner in Defendant's blade 
program.) (Ex. 28) This memo states in part: 
"As you are aware, I accepted several months 
ago an invitation on the part of Bill Findley 
and Steve Ascher to sit on the Board of the 
Ascher Findley Company. I felt at the time 
that given the contributions which Bill has 
made to Rocky Mountain Helicopt€»rs, that this 
reciprocal contribution of time and assistance 
would be appropriate..." 
"... I have indicated to Bill that my duties at 
Rocky Mountain Helicopters, particularly with 
respect to the specific projects in which I am 
now involved, must come before any assistance 
which I give to the Ascher Findley Company." 
"I would suggest that we proceed and determine 
exactly what kind of time requirements this 
commitment would impose on me. If it appears 
that such time requirements might become a 
problem, I would like to discuss that with you 
at that time." 
However, on April 16, 1984, Rocky Mountain Helicopters sued 
Plaintiff. This law suit was settled on or about April 19, 1984, 
Based on this lawsuit and other factors, the relationship between 
Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Jim Burr and plaintiff was left 
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strained. (R298 p.24) 
The testimony of Mr. Lewis Tippetts, one of the unbiased 
witnesses called at trial, (TR.146) is that one of the reasons for 
Mr. Burr terminating Mr. Smith was because of Smith's failure to 
cooperate with regards to the proceeds of an insurance policy on a 
crashed helicopter. (TR.149) 
Mr. Smith was at all times ready, willing and able to perform 
under the contract. He simply was not allowed to by the defendant. 
Defendant contends that Plaintiff was not available and was 
terminated due to his unavailability. Defendant says that he had 
attempted to contact plaintiff more than five times in a two-month 
period of time. (TR. 189) Smith has stated that those messages 
were not about the company but had to do with the helicopter 
insurance situation. Smith states "...there was never a single 
message either at my home or where my wife stays a hundred percent 
of the time or at the office in California where I was doing the 
consulting work where there was someone at the phone all the time. 
There was never a single contact to me to ask for assistance in the 
consulting." (TR 219) 
The termination by Burr occurred because of the law suit 
brought by Smith and the personality differences that he had with 
Burr, Smith never failed to properly perform an essential aspect 
of his job function. He simply was not allowed to perform his job 
function at all. The Utah Supreme Court held: 
In cases of equity, Supreme Court may weight 
the evidence and determine the facts but there 
is indulged a presumption of correctness of the 
findings and judgment of the trial court; where 
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the evidence may conflict, Supreme Court will 
not upset the lower courtf s findings unless the 
evidence clearly preponderates against them," 
Ovard v. Cannon, 600 P. 2d 1246 (Utah 1979) See 
also Sharpe v. American Medical Systems, Inc., 
671 P.2d 185 (Utah 1983); Hunter v. Hunter, 669 
P.2d 430 (Utah 1983) 
The trial court found the evidence sufficient to support a 
finding of wrongful termination, and this ruling should not be 
disturbed. 
POINT III. 
TO PRESERVE A CONTENTION OF ERROR ON APPEAL, THE PARTY 
CLAIMING ERROR IN ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE MUST RAISE THE OBJECTION 
TO THE TRIAL COURT IN CLEAR AND CONCISE TERMS AND IN A TIMELY 
FASHION. 
Defendant argues that the trial court's award of damages to 
Plaintiff for a gasoline benefit ($600.00) and medical insurance 
expenses ($2,699.55) are not supported by sufficient evidence. At 
the trial, evidence on damages was proffered by Plaintiff's counsel 
without any objection from the Defendant. (Tr. 76) When 
Defendant's counsel did make an objection to the evidence regarding 
damages, it was met with a replacement proffer by Plaintiff's 
counsel, stating that Plaintiff's testimony represented the total 
amount of medical expenses incurred by Plaintiff, as shown on 
Plaintiff's records. There was no objection made by Defendant to 
the second proffer. (Tr. 77-78) 
Because Defendant failed to object to the subsequent proffer 
of damages, Defendant has in effect stipulated that the amount of 
damages were admissable. The Utah Supreme Court has held that 
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where there is no clear and definite objection made at trial, the 
issue cannot be raised on appeal. Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 
Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984) 
If no objection is made to the subject testimony at the time 
of trial, then any objection must be considered waived. Forsyth v. 
Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358 (Utah 1980); Knighten v. Manning, 84 Utah 
1, 33 P.ed 401 (1934). In his closing argument, Defendant did make 
an objection to the subsequent proffer made by Plaintiff's counsel 
concerning the amount of damages. This objection was not timely 
and Defendant has waived the right to bring the issue up on appeal. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
ITS CONCLUSION THAT 500 SHARES ISSUED TO 
PLAINTIFF WERE ISSUED WITHOUT THE RIGHT OF RECALL. 
The trial court held that the 500 shares issued to Plaintiff 
as a bonus, in consideration of past loyal service and performance, 
were not subject to the call provisions of the Consulting Agreement 
and the Escrow Agreement. (R. 300) 
Defendant contends that all stock issued to employees on 
November 15, 1983, was issued subject to restrictions. Exhibit 23, 
which is the ratification of the resolution issuing the 
aforementioned stock to various employees, does not show any such 
restrictions. The testimony of Mr. Burr, regarding the stock, is 
unclear. Burr does not describe the November 15, 1983, issuance of 
stock to key employees of Rocky Mountain Helicopters, rather, he 
speaks in very general terms regarding stock issued to employees. 
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(TR. 174) 
Counsel for Plaintiff objected to this line of testimony as 
being overly broad and the objection was sustained by the trial 
court. Defendant offered no further evidence that any of the 
shares issued on November 15, 1983, were issued subject to any 
restrictions. (Tr. 174-175) 
The findings of the trial court should not be disturbed unless 
there is no substantial record evidence to support them. Harline 
v. Campbell, 728 P.2d 980 (Utah 1986); Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 
757 (Utah 1985) 
In the instant case there is clearly substantial evidence to 
support the trial court's conclusion. (See Ex. 23) The trial 
court is free to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and a 
conflict in evidence alone is not grounds for reversal. Chandler 
v. Mathews, 734 P.2d 907 (Utah 1987) 
The trial court in the instant case listened to the testimony 
of Burr, reviewed the evidence, and made its ruling. (R. 300) 
According to Utah law, the trial court's ruling on this matter 
should be affirmed. 
POINT V 
CONSIDERING ALL MATERIAL FACTS, DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED 
TO RETURN OF THE DISPUTED STOCK AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. There Was Valid Consideration On the Part Of Both Parties 
Which Entitled Smith To Earn The Disputed Shares Of Stock. 
It is clear from the resolution of the Board of Directors of 
Rocky Mountain (Ex. 23) that Smith's performance had gone above and 
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beyond what he had already obligated himself to do. Smith not only 
secured the payoff of the Teachers Insurance Fund obligation debt 
via refinancing, but he also obtained a $750,000 discount of said 
debt. At this point in time, Smith earned the stock. (Tr. 196) 
Because of Smith's performance, and in consideration of Smith's 
performance in securing these releases, the 11,445 shares of stock 
were issued to Smith. This performance by Smith is sufficient 
consideration for Smith to have received the stock. 
B. Defendant's Rights Of Recall Outlined In The Letters Of 
September 20 and December 8, 1982, Were Eliminated By 
The Subsequent Escrow Agreement. 
The Escrow Agreement states as follows: 
"It is understood between ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
HELICOPTERS, INC., and Richard S. Smith that 
this Escrow Agreement replaces the Letter 
Agreements evidenced by letters dated September 
20, 1982, and December 8, 1982, and is the sole 
agreement between them governing the 
disposition of the stock described herein." 
(Ex. 14, italics added) 
This document was prepared by Defendant's attorney, Jerry 
Thorn, and signed by both Plaintiff and Defendant. Plaintiff 
stated at trial that "By mutual agreement, we eliminated the rights 
of recall under the Escrow Agreement and that replaced the prior 
agreements." (TR. 109) 
Although Defendant now argues that there was never mutual 
assent of the parties to the elimination of the rights of recall, 
the document clearly speaks for itself. 
11 
DATED this 2^ > day o;f February, 1988. 
Attorney for Plaintiff, Appellant 
and Cross Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the c,^ day of February, 1988, I 
caused to be served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Reply 
Brief by placing said copy in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Robert S. Young 
P. 0. Box 1337 
Provo, UT 84603 
Frederick Jackman, 
1327 South 800 Ea 
Orem, UT 84058 
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